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Abstract
Japan is often seen as pacifist and as a defender of nuclear disarmament. This 
article, though, sustains that Japan is basing its security on extended nuclear 
deterrence, and on the possibility of acquiring nuclear weapons. In the first 
part of the article, the role of extended deterrence in the relationship with 
the U.S. is analyzed, and in the second, the history of the Japanese nuclear 
option since the end of the Second World War is reassessed.
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Introduction
In an unstable scenario as that of Asia, the present decade (2010s) has contributed with some elements that have left it even more 
complex and insecure. With President Obama, the United States, 
which has been the guarantor of a relative strategic regional 
stability since the beginning of the century, signaled its interest 
in assuming a more hegemonic regional position, with the 
proposals to return to Asia and with the leadership of the Trans-
Pacific Partnership (TPP), seeking to isolate or contain China. 
President Trump, on the other hand, has promoted a radical 
strategic reshuffling by assuming the “America First’’ strategy, by 
withdrawing from the TPP, by questioning the bilateral agreement 
and military exercises with South Korea, and by initiating a 
trade war with China. With these steps, worries have spread in 
Japan regarding the possibility that the U.S. might abandon the 
Japan-U.S. Alliance and discontinue the extended deterrence, 
on which its national security has been based.
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Secondly, Asia, as one of the most militarized global regions1, with the highest military 
budgets, troop contingencies, an abundance of military equipment, and large number of nuclear 
states, distinguishes itself by the absence of regional security mechanisms, as for instance, a 
NATO. The rapid modernization of the Chinese armed forces (Gady 2017a, 212) and the North 
Korean aggressiveness can be highlighted in this respect. The launching of missiles, including 
the intercontinental Hwasong-15, and the test of a hydrogen bomb has made it clear that North 
Korea already is a nuclear power, with the capacity to reach Guam, to devastate Seoul and Tokyo 
and, - in the absence of other options - use its nuclear capabilities as an instrument of bargaining 
or persuasion, or if necessary, go to war.
Thirdly, Japan is advancing in its process of normalization, which implies possessing armed 
forces as a legitimate foreign policy instrument, with right to act in collective self-defense operations 
as a way to contribute to the maintenance of regional and international security. In practice, 
Japan has already been “normalized,” even though its armed forces euphemistically are referred 
to as “self-defense forces.” 
 Nevertheless, such an officialization raises a series of questions: what will the reaction from 
neighboring countries be? Will the bilateral alliance with the U.S. be discontinued? To this can 
be added the doubt of whether Japan, in spite of its anti-nuclear position, will prefer a nuclear 
option, especially in the case that it no longer would enjoy the protection of the U.S. nuclear 
umbrella. In any circumstance, the empirical base for these questions relates to the recognition 
of the chronic Japanese vulnerability (Kelly 2015). 
In July 2018, the Japanese government approved the revision of the new Basic Energy Plan, 
thus signaling its interest in expanding its investments in renewable energy (solar and wind), but 
still affirming that nuclear energy would continue to hold an important place within its energy 
matrix. Still, the Ministerial Cabinet for the first time stated its intention to reduce its plutonium 
stock, apparently as a response to U.S.’ pressures related to the early renewal of the U.S.-Japan 
Agreement of the Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy (Associated Press 2018). 
It has been assessed that in 2030, nuclear energy will represent 20-22% of total energy 
consumption, renewables 22-24%, and that the rest will be based on fossil fuels (gas and coal). 
Considering that in 2017 fossil fuels represented 83% of electricity consumption, renewables 
15%, and nuclear energy just 2%2, it becomes difficult to imagine where this increase in nuclear 
energy would come from (Bungate 2018). It may thus be questioned whether the strong Japanese 
interest in plutonium relates to electricity, nuclear technology harnessing, or the possibility of 
developing nuclear weapons.  
1 “According to the International Institute of Strategic Studies’ Military Balance 2017, the three largest defense budgets in the world (the 
United States, China, and Russia) are by countries with significant military assets in the region. Six Asia-Pacific powers were under the top 
ten global military spenders in 2016. The world’s seven largest militaries including China, the United States, India, North Korea, Russia, 
Pakistan, and South Korea are all (at least partly) found in Asia. Furthermore, out of the seven six are nuclear powers” (Gady 2017b).
2 “Just before the 2011 earthquake, nearly 30% of electric power in Japan was generated by nuclear plants” (Nagao 2018). And, “as a result, 
the share of nuclear power fell from 28.6% in 2010 to nil in 2014” (Bungate 2018).
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The prospect of Japan possessing nuclear weapons is an extremely sensitive and controversial 
issue. Nonetheless, it cannot be denied that since the Soviet nuclear tests in 1949, the issue has 
spurred Japanese preoccupations about how to avoid new attacks on its territory. Hence, upon the 
Chinese nuclear tests in 1964, the questions relating to the U.S. nuclear umbrella and whether 
Japan should possess nuclear weapons have been on the Japanese agenda. 
Kamiya (2002) strongly denies the possibility of nuclearization due to strong Japanese popular 
resistance, while Mochizuki (2007) defends the reinforcement of the Japan-US Alliance along with the 
improvement of defensive capabilities, including missile defenses, as a way to avoid a nuclear option. 
In practice, Japan adopts an ambivalent or contradictory position. While, on the one hand, it opposes 
nuclear weapons and defends global nuclear disarmament, on the other, it seeks security under the U.S. 
nuclear umbrella and recognizes the utility of extended nuclear deterrence (Van de Velde 1988, 19).
Various analysts have highlighted that Japan retains sufficient technological knowledge to 
develop nuclear weapons, but that it would only make use of this option in case that it would be 
forced to uphold its security (Oros 2017; Roehrig 2017). In this regard, Schoff (2009) highlights 
that the question is not “whether” Japan will develop nuclear capabilities, but rather “why?”. For 
Hughes (2007a), the question neither relates to “if ” but rather “when?”. Furthermore, for Samuels 
and Schoff (2013), the key questions relate to how Japan perceives its options, how its calculus might 
change, and what this might mean for the region and for the Japan-U.S. Alliance. Consequently, part 
of the equation has to do with the population’s position and the Japanese government. Concerning 
the Japanese vulnerability, a central risk relates to the possibility of being abandoned by the U.S. 
and the loss of confidence in the U.S. interest in defending it.
The objective of this article is to demonstrate that Japan, even though it presents itself as 
pacifist, anti-nuclear, and as a defender of nuclear disarmament, maintains an option focused on 
mastering nuclear technology. As this is a dual technology, it can be used both for pacific purposes 
(energy) as well as military objectives (armament). Does this nuclear option indicate that Japan will 
remilitarize? Would a hypothetical nuclear acquisition be grounded in internal or external factors? 
Is there really a “nuclear allergy” in Japan?
The first part of this reflection aims towards reaching an understanding of the contradictory 
Japanese position, which on one hand opposes nuclear weapons, and on the other, claims the right 
to be under the U.S. nuclear umbrella. It also treats the importance which Japan ascribes to the 
perspective of extended deterrence. The second part concentrates on the analysis of the Japanese 
process of nuclear development, and on the strategy to legitimize this both internally and externally. 
The nuclear duality: opposition to weapons and emphasis on extended 
deterrence
There is consensus within the literature about a profound Japanese aversion in relation to 
all kinds of nuclear material, deriving from the attacks with nuclear bombs on Hiroshima and 
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Nagasaki, and from the contamination of Japanese fishermen from the U.S. nuclear test on the 
Bikini Islands in the South Pacific (1954) or from the incidents in Fukushima in 20113. If this 
aversion can be identified within the Japanese population, apparently, this is not the case within 
the state. Even despite the strong opposition of the population against nuclear weapons, “Japanese 
leaders have been far less “allergic” and have periodically examined the possibility of acquiring 
nuclear weapons” (Roehrig 2017, 123).
Since the end of the 1950s, Japan has made clear that it will maintain the right to develop 
its nuclear arsenal. “This strategy - ‘lying between nuclear pursuit and nuclear rollback’ - is the 
essence of ‘the most salient example of nuclear hedging’ among global powers” (Samuels and 
Schoff 2013, 234).
The Chinese decision to develop nuclear capacities, officially announced in 1955, and the 
Sino-Soviet nuclear cooperation (1955-1959) exacerbated the Japanese preoccupations, not least 
considering that the potential Chinese threat was more preoccupying than the Soviet menace 
(Shihmin 1997, 686). Because of the Chinese nuclear tests in 1964, Japan and India sought 
inclusion under the extended deterrence of the U.S.. Considering the possession of such weapon 
capacities by Japan to be more worrisome than by India, the U.S. responded positively to the 
Japanese demand, but not to that of India. The possibility of developing nuclear weapons “has 
thus given Japan an implicit nuclear deterrence and has strengthened its relations with the United 
States” (Nagao 2018).
The declaration made by Prime Minister Kishi Nobosuke in 1957, that the Constitution 
would not implicitly prohibit the possession of nuclear weapons, would become institutionalized as 
the official Constitutional interpretation. Behind this position was the logic that nuclear weapons 
also had a defensive nature and, “simply represent a difference in the quality rather than kind of 
weapons, and are thus in keeping with ‘individual self-defence’,” which the Constitution permits 
(Hook 1996, 79), as well as the belief that they “make war less likely, because nuclear weapons 
encourage both defense and deterrence” (Sagan and Waltz 2002). Yet, nuclear weapons do not 
automatically dissuade a potential challenger (Lupovici 2010, 714). 
This interpretation was based on the questioning of how to guarantee security without 
weapons in an unstable environment. Due to the pressures of Kishi, the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty 
was revisited in 1960 and thereupon introduced the obligation on behalf of the U.S. to defend 
Japan, yet without any direct mentioning of the extended deterrence or the nuclear umbrella. It 
should be noted that the Japanese anti-nuclear movement did not directly relate to the politics 
of nuclear deterrence in its demands for banning nuclear weapons. In internal competition, the 
Japanese Socialist Party and the Japanese Communist Party sought to align the anti-nuclear cause 
with their own political agendas to strengthen the popular opposition to the government’s defense 
3 At the present moment, for example, one of the main challenges to reactivate or construct new nuclear energy reactors is exactly to surpass 
the resistance within local communities. Considering that the Japanese society is largely against nuclear weapons due to its pacifist identity, 
Topaloff (2017) highlights that this might change very quickly due to the growing North Korean threat.
Japan: A Nuclear State?
Rev. Bras. Polít. Int., 62(1): e007, 2019 Oliveira  
5
policy and alignment with the U.S.. Thereby, the term of nuclear deterrence was not part of the 
Japanese vocabulary until the beginning of the 1960s (Kurosaki 2018, 116). 
Katzenstein and Okawara (1993, 167) defend that “the government’s non-nuclear policy 
since the late 1950s had been a matter of policy discretion rather than a constitutional 
requirement.” This thesis is corroborated by Shihmim (1997, 687) who emphasizes that nuclear 
development is not a constitutional issue, but rather a political question depending on the 
divergent positions between nationalists and anti-nuclear pacifists. Vogel (1992, 69-70) further 
adds that the choice primarily is political and not determined by the lack of technological 
capacity. The reason that Japan has not yet developed nuclear weapons derives much more 
from the credibility of the deterrence extended by the U.S. and its geostrategic position in 
Asia, than from the “idealistic pronouncements of Japan’s commitment to remaining nuclear 
weapons-free” (Van de Velde 1988, 20).
Departing from the Japanese rhetoric against nuclear weapons, from the “Three Non-Nuclear 
Principles’’ (do not produce, do not do not possess, and do not allow the presence of nuclear 
weapons on your soil), and from the fact of having enjoyed the U.S. nuclear umbrella for more 
than 60 years, Ota (2018) uses the term of a “conceptual policy twist’’ to characterize the Japanese 
security policy in relation to nuclear weapons. In contrast to many other analysts who characterize 
the Japanese policy as ambivalent and contradictory (Van de Velde 1988; Corben 2017), Ota also 
sees this as ambivalent, but coherent.
The expression of a “conceptual policy twist” illustrates the existence of a profound divide 
between the Japanese elites and general public. The elites tend towards adopting a nuclear position 
in accordance with the established nuclear structures, such as the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and 
the Japan-U.S. Nuclear Cooperation Agreement, while the Japanese public tends to embrace a 
sort of ambivalent posture, relating to its past experiences with nuclear weapons, as in the attacks 
on Hiroshima and Nagasaki (Ota 2018, 195).
The “secret nuclear agreements with the U.S.;” the Nipo-American development cooperation 
around the programme for the “peaceful” use of nuclear energy, and the role of Japan in the 
promotion of nuclear disarmament can be viewed as expressions of this sort of ambivalence and 
coherence. The opposition to the U.S.’ adoption of the principle of “no first use” and the lack 
of support for the UN resolution that bans nuclear weapons, stand as more recent examples of 
this posture. 
The “secret nuclear agreements” permitted the transport of nuclear weapons in U.S. 
navy vessels on Japanese territory, which took place in 1960 and 1969, and which were not 
informed to the population or the Diet, while the official position of the U.S. always was that of 
“neither confirming, nor denying” the presence of nuclear weapons (Roehrig 2017). In the first 
agreement, Japan accepted the U.S.’ interpretation that the prohibition of the introduction of 
nuclear weapons did not include the transport by marine vessels. The other agreement, though, 
was part of the negotiations to return Okinawa to Japan, and mandated the withdrawal of U.S. 
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weapons, but permitted the reallocation in case of emergency (Wampler 2009; Masayuki 2011; 
Roehrig 2017; Ota 2018).
When the secret agreements were made public in 2009, it was surprising that popular 
reactions were relatively calm. Satoh (2014) attributes this to the fact that the U.S. has not been 
positioning nuclear weapons in Japan since 1991, and mainly also to the circumstance that the 
Japanese population was more conscious of the importance of extended deterrence, and the potential 
threats related to the North Korean nuclear development. In any case, the secret nuclear agreements 
derive from the proliferation of the feeling of insecurity in Japan, and from the pressure of the 
U.S. to commit to defend Japan, not only from conventional aggression, but also from nuclear 
attacks. Thereby, while Japan pragmatically held the door open for the nuclear option and sought 
to develop nuclear capacities, it turned towards the existing legal and institutional protections, 
multilateral regimes, and the extended nuclear deterrence (Hughes 2007a, 68). 
The central pillar of the Japanese nuclear policy is its dependence on extended nuclear 
deterrence by the U.S., with recognition of its role both in terms of regional security, and the 
maintenance of the Japan-U.S. Alliance as a way to augment its deterrence credibility. The Japanese 
nuclear policy is still complemented by the strategy of latent deterrence, or rather, “the maintenance 
of the ability to develop quickly a nuclear deterrent” (Hoey 2016, 485). 
Even though mainly for pacific purposes, as it is a dual technology, Japan allocated considerable 
resources to master the complete nuclear cycle, which would make it possible to affirm that “Japan 
has the technology to make a nuclear weapon fairly quickly” (Oros 2017, 40). Nonetheless, the 
prohibitively high economic, political, and diplomatic costs have dissuaded the production of 
nuclear weapons, but are still “leaving the door open for this path should there be drastic changes 
in the security environment or deterioration of the U.S. extended deterrence commitment’’ 
(Roehrig 2017, 97). Therefore, it can be presumed that in principle, Japan has not, and will not, 
pursue real access to nuclear weapons, unless the U.S.’ commitment to keep the country under 
its nuclear umbrella ceases to exist.
The academic literature on Japan’s possibility to maintain an independent deterrence capacity 
presents two general lines of thought. One emphasizes the inevitability, or strong probability, 
that Japan will combine its economic and military power. The other defends that the “nuclear 
allergy” would impede the nuclear option. In this vein, there is an academic perspective that 
condemns the Japanese “nuclear duality,” referring to the defense of an anti-nuclear position in 
combination with the confidence in the extended deterrence (Hoey 2016, 486). In this sense, 
within the Japanese political perception, deterrence is interpreted as an instrument to guarantee 
and amplify security, while maintaining ties to the U.S., but also as a justification for possessing 
nuclear weapons in the case that the military alliance is discontinued.
The theory of extended deterrence4 comprises of a defender’s action to protect allies from 
an attack. It presupposes that eventually, if costs surpass gains, the challenger will very likely be 
4 The literature highlights two main sources of dissuasion; deterrence by denial and deterrence by punishment. The first seeks to prevent 
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dissuaded. In this respect, the extended deterrence refers to the ample commitment of a state to 
defend an ally and involves a multiplicity of means that might include nuclear weapons. Yet, the 
nuclear umbrella is only one possible characteristic of a relation of extended deterrence, as these 
two are interchangeable (Roehrig 2017, 14-17). 
Based on Schelling’s definition of deterrence as “a threat ... intended to keep an adversary 
from doing something,” Wilson (2008, 435) questions its efficiency and classifies it as being a form 
of speculation; “nuclear deterrence postulates novel behavior that might happen in unexplored 
circumstances that could arise sometime in the unforeseeable future. It is (almost) pure speculation.” 
His reasoning is based on the affirmation that the U.S.’ nuclear capacity did not dissuade neither 
North Korea, nor Vietnam from going to war and equally did not dissuade Iraq or Afghanistan. 
Wilson (2007; 2008) questions the implications of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, highlighting that 
the Japanese surrender did not result from nuclear attacks, but rather from the fear of a Soviet 
invasion, after that country had declared war.
In his understanding, the theory of deterrence was developed at a moment in which massive 
retaliation was the dominant concept related to nuclear war. Nonetheless, might retaliation on 
a smaller scale not also dissuade in the same way? (Wilson 2007, 179). In this respect, Roehrig 
(2017, 13) agrees with Wilson (2008) in the observation that during the post 9/11 2001 period, 
“deterrence based only upon the threat of retaliation is less likely to work against leaders of 
rogue states more willing to take risks, gambling with the lives of their people, and the wealth 
of their nations.”
The theory advocates that for deterrence to be successful, it needs to be credible. This implies 
that an adversary needs to believe that the state which threatens with retaliation possesses the 
sufficient military capacities and the determination to uphold its commitment (Waltz 1990, 733). 
Traditional realism sustains that the observed reluctance in the use of nuclear weapons during 
the Cold War was a result of successful deterrence (Roehrig 2017, 29). With nuclear weapons, 
it becomes easier to project stability and peace because, “the problem of the credibility of deterrence, 
a big worry in a conventional world, disappears in a nuclear one” (Waltz 1990, 734).
Even though significant questions of credibility persist, the continuity of the nuclear umbrella 
derives from the political and symbolic benefits which it provides, because its existence constitutes 
a very significant factor in reassuring allies. These benefits can be identified from the fact that 
the extended deterrence by the U.S. to Japan and South Korea often has been emphasized as very 
significant, as it is an integral part of the U.S.’ foreign policy for East Asia (Roehrig 2017, 193). 
Credibility is thereby one of the most important factors in relation to this issue (Fitzpatrick 
2016, 166) and it constitutes an important pillar in the Japan-U.S. Alliance for the maintenance 
of a sense of relative security below the U.S. nuclear umbrella. Japan does nonetheless maintain 
a preventive strategy of mastering nuclear technology, possessing installations, plutonium stocks, 
action by making the challenger realize that he lacks capacity due to the superior capacities of the defender. The second seeks to persuade 
the challenger that the price that he will pay will surpass any possible gains (Lupovici 2016, 5)
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and production capacity in an immediate emergency situation, when this confidence might 
have become exhausted. In this respect, two issues are of utmost importance. The first relates to 
the confirmation of the commitment to use nuclear weapons to defend Japan, and the second, 
to having its own nuclear program (Samuels and Schoff 2013, 236-237). 
Upon the disaster at the nuclear plant in Fukushima, the Minister of Defense at the time, 
Ishiba Shigeru, declared “I don’t think Japan needs to possess nuclear weapons, but it’s important 
to maintain our commercial reactors because it would allow us to produce a nuclear warhead in 
a short amount of time. It’s a tacit nuclear deterrent.” (Roehrig 2017, 196). To this should be 
added the importance of prestige, and the understanding that in order to be a regional power, 
it becomes absolutely vital to possess nuclear capacities. When the Non-Proliferation Treaty 
(NPT) was approved in 1968, Japanese conservatives understood that these dispositions would 
have implications both for Japan’s power status, but also in terms of commercial and technological 
advantages. Thus, Japan would be excluded from the “nuclear club” and relegated to the status 
of a second-rank power. The perception that the West had changed its view on China after 1964 
was of great concern to Japan (Pyle 2007, 250-253).
During all of the post-war period, there was a constant worry about a possible nuclear attack, 
and whether the U.S. in fact would make use of its deterrence capacity to defend Japan. Although 
there was no doubt about the U.S.’ self-defense capacity, there has been much uncertainty with 
regards to the question of whether the U.S. would apply its nuclear weapons in defense of Japan 
in a situation of extended deterrence (Roehrig 2017, 2). As Kissinger highlights, “great powers 
don’t commit suicide for their allies” (Colby 2018, 30).
These questions have without any doubt gained further attention in the present century 
with the increasingly lax control of the nuclear proliferation, both in relation to states as well as 
non-state actors, not least with regards to the existence of a nuclear black market (Wan 2017, 69), 
and the high concentration of nuclear states in Asia. On the other hand, U.S. complaints about 
high military costs and demands directed towards South Korea and Japan for higher military 
spending have incentivized the acquisition of nuclear weapons (Schoff 2009; Woonink 2017; 
Roehrig 2017; Tannenwald 2018). 
This question of credibility is extremely urgent, considering that the power-balance in North 
East Asia is changing, as North Korea has become a nuclear state with launching technology 
and capacities, and with China modernizing its conventional military capacities and raising its 
investments. The rising dependencies, the clear vulnerabilities, and the increase in nuclear states in 
the region has thereby forced Japan to expand its conventional military capacities, and to develop 
nuclear capabilities to defend its interests (Waltz 2000, 33). 
As the dissuasive logic is abstract and deductive, as well as the shortcomings which have been 
attributed to it (Waltz 1990, 736), the feeling of distrust is amplified as the U.S. is unilaterally 
imposing changes to trade agreements (North American Free Trade Agreement, TPP, U.S.-Korea 
Free Trade Agreement), and military treaties (NATO), and furthermore is relatively far from 
encountering a solution to the conflict in Syria and the Ukraine. On the other hand, Japan did 
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receive the 2018 U.S. Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) positively, as the country was kept within 
the U.S. nuclear umbrella, and because the U.S. committed itself to offer an extended nuclear 
deterrence, including the “deployment of nuclear cruise missiles” (“Japan’s dependence on nuclear 
umbrella highlighted as it hails new US policy.” 2018). The NPR inaugurated an unprecedented 
approach through the employment of nuclear weapons in response to “significant non-nuclear 
strategic attacks” against the U.S. and its allies (O’Neil 2018; Abe 2018, 146).
The Japanese position, refusing to sign the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons 
and the resumption of the opposition to the U.S.’ adoption of the No First Use policy on behalf 
of the Abe government in 2012, clearly indicates that Japan still adheres strongly to the principle 
of nuclear deterrence, be this either guaranteed by the U.S., or independently upheld through 
development of autonomous nuclear capacities (Abe 2018; Hurst 2018; “Abe should keep pledge 
to lead on elimination of nuclear weapons.” 2018). 
The perception that Japan’s relationship to nuclear weapons is complex, is widespread within 
the literature. As it is the only country that has been subjected to the use of nuclear weapons, 
it presents a unequivocally clear position in defense of a nuclear-free world. Nuclear disarmament 
is thus a clear priority within its national security policy, and it has been very active within 
international forums in the defense of non-proliferation and the eradication of nuclear weapons.
On the other hand, pressed by the U.S.-Soviet dispute during the Cold War, it sought 
extended dissuasion provided by the U.S. to defend itself from the threats of nuclear weapons. 
Furthermore, in the Post-Cold War, with the new threats from the North Korean nuclearization 
and the amplification of the Chinese capacities, it maintained the extended nuclear dissuasion as 
a fundamental security strategy (Tatsumi 2018). This complexity, or duality, is likewise present 
within the general antimilitarist perception in Japan, which apparently never was a completely 
“pacifist security identity,” as it maintained a role for an army in the post-war and led Japan to 
join a military alliance (Oros 2017, 56). 
Yet, some recent developments such as i) the global resumption of large investments in 
nuclear arsenals, especially in Russia, China, India and Pakistan, apart from North Korea; ii) the 
U.S. policy of “no first use;” or iii) Trump’s suggestion that Japan and South Korea should possess 
their own nuclear weapons (Tannenwald 2018) “have posed a set of serious questions on how 
Japan should continue to balance between its aspiration for nuclear disarmament and its need 
for an effective nuclear deterrent for its own security” (Tatsumi 2018, 12). 
Due to the complexity of the dilemma between disarmament and extended dissuasion, 
Tatsumi and Kennedy (2018, 80) highlight that “to create a nuclear weapons-free world in the 
future, Japan must vigorously seek solutions with the international community, but to remain 
secure from threats in East Asia, Japan must maintain some form of deterrence.” This reflection 
permits us to raise the hypothesis that in the absence of extended dissuasion on behalf of the 
U.S., an alternative form of dissuasion could be the independent possession of nuclear weapons, 
without renouncing the ambition to defend a nuclear-free world.
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The Japanese nuclear development
Japan has a long history of research on nuclear technology, dating back to the War of the 
Pacific (Fitzpatrick 2016, 162; Kristof 1995). As the viability of developing a nuclear weapon was 
confirmed (Kristof 1995), the first project (Ni-Go) was initiated in 1941, with the installment of 
a laboratory close to Tokyo on orders from the Japanese Imperial Army. In 1942-43, the Imperial 
Japanese Navy also initiated another project (F-Go) in Kyoto (Japanese atomic bomb project 2016; 
“Nuclear weapons program.” 2012). A common problem for both of these projects was the lack of 
financial resources and especially the difficulty of acquiring uranium ore. While the U.S.’ research 
took place in cooperation with the U.K., Japan´s scarce resources and efforts were divided between 
the Navy and the Army, and it was not able to expand cooperation to include Germany. In 1945, 
a German ship was captured as it tried to bring 560 kilos of uranium oxide to a Japanese project 
(Kristof 1995; Japanese atomic bomb project 2016; “Nuclear weapons program.” 2012).
Although Japan did not possess sufficient knowledge or resources to complete the construction 
of a nuclear bomb, the expertise of the Japanese scientists5, and the fact that it as one of the only 
countries apart from the U.S. possessed at least five nuclear particle accelerators, should not be 
overlooked (Henshall 2004, 221). 
With the occupation by the U.S. armed forces, the nuclear programme was discontinued by 
orders from General MacArthur in 1946, who mandated the total deactivation of nuclear research 
and the destruction of nuclear particle accelerators (Kurosaki 2018, 106). With the beginning of 
the Cold War and the Korean War, in spite of the article 9 of the Japanese constitution, - a clause of 
renunciation of war which had been imposed by MacArthur, - the U.S. began to press systematically 
for the Japanese rearmament, as it began to realize the country’s weakness, as well as the need to 
halt Soviet and Chinese advances (Pyle 2007; Cha 2009/2010; Choong 2015). Simultaneously, 
the U.S. authorized the Japanese weapon production and returned its military installations, 
thereby creating conditions for the revitalization of the Japanese economy and advancement of 
dual technology (Drifte 1986; Coulmy 1991). 
Upon visiting the U.S.’ nuclear energy plants in 1953, Nakasone declared the “indispensability 
of nuclear power to Japan’s rise from its fourth-class nation status.” In response to the critics, 
and in line with Eisenhower’s posture, a distinction was made which implied the “separation 
between atoms for peace, and atoms for destruction” (Kinefuchi 2015, 451). Japan did not cede 
to the U.S. pressures to participate in the Korean and the Vietnam wars, pointing to the explicit 
prohibition in the Article 9 of the country’s constitution. But this pacifism did not halt Kishi 
Nobosuke from declaring in 1957 that the constitution did not veto the possession of nuclear 
weapons (Choong 2015, 179; Yoshihara and Holmes 2009). Although Sato introduced the Three 
5 Even though they were conscious of the viability of producing a nuclear weapon, Japanese scientists were convinced that no country would 
be able to develop such capabilities before the end of the War, and were thereby shocked when they discovered the US’ advances upon the 
attack on Hiroshima and Nagasaki (Kurosaki 2018, 105; Grunow 2003, 155). 
Japan: A Nuclear State?
Rev. Bras. Polít. Int., 62(1): e007, 2019 Oliveira  
11
Non-Nuclear Principles, successive prime ministers have maintained Kishi’s interpretation of the 
constitutional allowance for the possession of nuclear weapons.
Underlining that the speculations about Japanese nuclear intentions are by no means of 
a recent date, Kase (2001, 55) highlights that in 1957, a report from the U.S. Department of 
State mentioned the possibility of Japan developing its own nuclear weapons under conservative 
governments. The definition of the Japanese nuclear policy advanced consistently with the approval 
of the Atomic Energy Basic Act for peaceful means in 1955, clearly demonstrating the Japanese 
intent to master the different stages of nuclear energy (Roehrig 2017, 40). And, in order to 
confirm its restricted use for peaceful means, Japan adhered to the International Energy Atomic 
Agency (IAEA) in 1957. 
The Japanese interests gained a higher degree of legitimacy with the signature of the U.S.-Japan 
Nuclear Research Agreement (Agreement 123) with focus on civil nuclear energy cooperation, 
in 1955. This nuclear cooperation is still in effect today, and has been renewed in 1958, 1968, 
1973 and in 1988, thus securing the supply of uranium and enriched uranium by the U.S., 
and importantly, permitting the reprocessing of plutonium. Upon the expected revision of the 
accord in 2018, it was automatically renewed in January 2018, apparently with the objective of 
avoiding questionings in the respective legislative cases (“United States: Agreements for cooperation 
concerning the civil uses of atomic energy, with India and certain other countries.” 1963, 897-98; 
Sekiguchi 2018; Wan 2017, 73; Yoshida 2018). Through the Chinese perspective, the automatic 
renewal of the Agreement 123 indicated that Washington is adopting a more tolerant posture 
with regards to the Japanese possession of nuclear weapons, as “possessing the nuclear materials 
will undoubtedly add risks to the already unsteady security situation in Northeast Asia,” (Hong 
and Mengqi 2018).
A month after the introduction of the Three Non-Nuclear Principles, Sato, - conscious about 
the inefficiency of guaranteeing national security and as a possible constraint in relation to the 
continuation of pacific nuclear development, - presented the four pillars for national security, 
denominating these as the “Four Nuclear Policies.” Apart from the continuation of the Three 
Non-Nuclear Principles, these included the dependency in relation to the nuclear umbrella; the 
support for the global nuclear disarmament; and the promotion of the pacific use of nuclear 
energy. In reality, these pillars would constitute the long-term basis for the Japanese nuclear 
policies (Masayuki 2011, 102). 
It was the first time that Japan would officially recognize the significance of the U.S. nuclear 
umbrella in relation to its own national security (Schoff 2009, 27; Roehrig 2017, 44). Two 
months after the announcement of the Four Nuclear Policies, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) 
reorganized them by “putting the peaceful use of nuclear energy as the first priority, disarmament 
as the second, and dependence on the U.S. nuclear umbrella as the third” (Kase 2001, 60). Sato’s 
movements in relation to the four pillars of the LDP, prioritizing nuclear energy, clearly indicated 
an interest and a preoccupation that the Japanese nuclear development could be constrained by 
the NPT. 
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Events in 1960 became fundamental for the advancement of nuclear development and the 
obtainment of U.S. approval. They strongly influenced this apparent Japanese contradiction of, 
on the one hand, adopting and maintaining principles which did not permit the presence of nuclear 
weapons on Japanese territory, and on the other hand, not only highlighted the constitutionality, 
but also advanced technologies for uranium enrichment and reprocessing of plutonium with 
nuclear energy in mind. 
These factors were; i) the fact that the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, revisited in 1960, did not 
refer to the issue of the extended deterrence or the nuclear umbrella; ii) the growing feeling of 
threat and insecurity in Japan upon the Chinese nuclear tests (nuclear in 1964, missiles in 1966, 
and a hydrogen bomb in 1967); iii) the imposition of the NPT in 1968 and, iv) the negotiations 
to return Okinawa to Japanese sovereignty.
With the growing feeling of vulnerability due to the transformation of China into a nuclear 
state, as well as the military escalations of the U.S. in the Vietnam War, Sato intensified pressures 
for the U.S. to assume a more assertive and public position in terms of a emitting a strategic 
guarantee of extended deterrence, or that Japan would stay below the U.S. nuclear umbrella, even 
affirming that if not, Japan would be forced to develop its own nuclear weapons. Lyndon Johnson 
verbally committed himself to act in defense of Japan in the case of a nuclear threat (Kase 2001; 
Kishi 2018). Sato’s argument that the possession of nuclear weapons by China obliged Japan to 
obtain some of its own was decisive in ensuring Johnson’s commitment (Pyle 2007, 251).
A study from Sato’s cabinet criticized the Japanese Socialist Party’s “disarmed neutrality” 
and considered the proposal for a nuclear weapons free zone “unrealistic and marked by empty 
slogans” and accepted the presence in Japan of defenders of the possession of nuclear weapons, as 
China now had acquired such capabilities. It nonetheless emphasized the financial non-viability of 
the acquisition and possession of nuclear weapons. It thus proposed a division of responsibilities, 
with the U.S. including Japan in the nuclear deterrence, and Japan augmenting its conventional 
capabilities with self-defense in mind (Kishi 2018). 
In spite of the clear Japanese opposition to nuclear weapons, the growing threats hindered 
reflections about the convenience of possessing nuclear weapons. It was exactly at this moment 
in 1968 that the NPT was launched, demanding the adhesion of other countries. In this respect, 
it becomes interesting to observe Kase (2001, 56) who states that the main objects of the Treaty 
were Germany and Japan, who, due to their financial and technological capacities would be likely 
candidates for nuclear development. 
Japan’s great doubt was related to whether the NPT would create obstacles for the ongoing 
civil nuclear energy programme, and for the possibility to develop nuclear weapons in the future, 
without the extended deterrence. In line with values related to prestige and autonomy in order to 
reach its national objectives, the renouncement of nuclear knowhow, “would relegate Japan to a 
second-class position relative to other world powers“ (Roehrig 2017, 47). The Japanese reactions 
to the NPT were much more determined by the potential impact on the country’s civil nuclear 
programme, than by military security considerations. For some, the NPT presented itself as an 
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adapted version of “George Kennan’s strategy to exercise ‘veto power’ over Japanese diplomacy 
through control of energy supply” (Welfield 1988, 349). 
With this correlation between nuclear power and prestige, Kishi Nobusuke’s reasoning that the 
possession of nuclear weapons would not be unconstitutional, and the emphasis on the development 
and maintenance of a nuclear programme, had as its basic premise that “nuclear weapons were 
absolutely necessary if Japan were to have influence in world affairs” (Samuels and Schoff 2013, 
237). Nevertheless, Japan signed the NPT in February 1970, two months after Germany, but 
it only ratified the treaty in 1976, after the U.S. had approved its programme for handling and 
reprocessing of nuclear fuel (Fitzpatrick 2016, 162; Samuels and Schoff 2013, 234; Hoey 2016).
With the U.S.’ proclamation of the discontinuation of its supply of enriched uranium from 
1982, Japan opted for the development of an autonomous enrichment capacity, and managed to 
successfully extract plutonium oxide from bars of enriched uranium in 1983 (Welfield 1988, 349-51). 
The fact that the Three Non-Nuclear Principles prohibit the presence of nuclear weapons in the 
country became a hindering for the process of returning Okinawa to Japan, as the U.S. claimed 
that its presence was indispensable for regional security, not only for Japan, but also for South 
Korea and Taiwan. Confronted with popular and legislative pressures, the solution materialized 
in form of a secret accord between Sato and Nixon in 1969, which permitted the repositioning of 
secret weapons on Okinawa, in parallel to the legal process which returned the island to Japanese 
sovereignty (Kulacki 2018, 3-4; Roehrig 2017, 49; Komine 2014, 97).
Independently of how this “secret accord” can be characterized, as the issues related to 
security and nuclear power in Japan are complex, contradictory, or paradoxical, the country can 
nonetheless be deemed to be highly pragmatic. It contributed to the return of Okinawa, and to 
the plutonium reprocessing programme. It also still constitutes a fundamental landmark for the 
continuation of the bilateral nuclear cooperation between the U.S. and Japan. 
Even though he classified the reprocessing of plutonium as unnecessary or economically 
futile, Carter approved the Japanese reprocessing in the nuclear plant of Tokai (Yoshida 2018, 4), 
with experimental operations that were initiated in 1977 and which entered full force from 1981 
(“Tokai reprocessing plant to shut.” 2014). Deactivated upon the incidents in Fukushima in 2011, 
it will be substituted by the installations in Rokkasho.
Through the Agreement 123, Japan has become the only non-nuclear state which retains 
installations, technology, and permission both for the enrichment of uranium and for the 
reprocessing of plutonium (Park 2012, 24; Fitzpatrick 2016, 162; Yoshida 2018). Nevertheless, 
the plutonium stocks, their consumption, and the advanced nuclear technology of Japan raises 
a series of questions (Sekiguchi 2018). At first, this relates to the stocks, consumption capacity, 
and its purpose. The most recent estimates indicate that Japan retains approximately 47 tons of 
plutonium (Burr 2017; Sikeguchi 2018). Yet, since the Fukushima accident, and especially with 
the expansion of security measures, most of the nuclear plants are deactivated, as Japan practically 
does not consume any plutonium (Acton 2017). With only two plants in operation, consumption 
stands below two tons per year (Sikeguchi 2018). 
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Secondly, the new nuclear plant (Rokkasho Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing Facility)6 is configured 
to reprocess 8 tons of plutonium per year, independently of the already elevated stocks and the 
low annual consumption. Even with the new delays of the initiation of operations in Rokkasho, 
what would be the motivations for expansion of production of these stocks? To expand the 
production of electricity? To become an international supplier, or use for the development of 
nuclear weapons?
Finally, instead of continuing to use installations in the U.K. or France as previously, the 
decision to begin the reprocessing of plutonium in the installation in Rokkasho raised suspicions 
that Tokyo was preparing itself “to become nuclear.” The fact that the Japanese Atomic Energy 
Agency has not informed about the possession of 640 kg of plutonium in its voluntary declaration 
to the IAEA in 2014 “has added to the speculations that the country is actually planning something 
murky for the near future” (Topaloff 2017). According to Schoff (2009, 2) the credibility of the 
U.S.-Japan Alliance and of the extended deterrence is critical for the feeling of security in Japan, 
and also merges with another important factor, related to “the absence of a serious and consistent 
existential threat to Japan.”
Yet, with the growing deterioration of the East Asian security architecture, with North Korea 
becoming nuclear, China expanding its capacities, and the U.S. appearing to be in a process 
of distancing from its allies, could a real and persistent threat become evident? Although the 
reprocessing of plutonium is very present in the discussions about the Agreement 123, the question 
of energy security and the efficient use of scarce resources also gains a significant weight. The 
need for Japan to acquire a civil nuclear industry should therefore, and is indeed, being discussed, 
“but it is difficult to see how Japan without any nuclear energy7 can meet its climate change and 
energy security goals” (Yoshida 2018, 6).
Even though the reprocessing of plutonium is not necessarily the same as the processing 
of nuclear fuel for military purposes, it should be noted that “the Japanese government also felt 
that it made sense to retain at least a latent capability to exercise the nuclear option” (Mochizuki 
2007, 311). In 1969, a document from the Ministry of Foreign Relations in Japan declared that 
“for the time being Japan’s policy is not to have nuclear weapons, but we will always retain the 
economic and technical potential to manufacture nuclear weapons” (Oguma 2012).
In a pragmatic spirit, the Japanese political authorities never definitively renounced the nuclear 
option, considering the possibility of a failure in the North American nuclear umbrella. On the 
contrary, it discreetly maintained all technological possibilities open (Shimin 1997, 707). Even 
though the recent strategic changes in the East Asia have pressed Japan “to enlarge its conventional 
forces and to add nuclear ones to protect its interests” (Waltz 2000, 34), it is impossible to affirm 
6 New delays, announced in October 2017, postponed the initiation of operations from the second part of the fiscal year 2018, to the first 
half of 2021.  
7 Nuclear energy was extremely important for the development of the Japanese economy, being responsible for the generation of 30% of 
electrical energy in Japan until the tsunami of 2011, and significantly reduced the cost of protecting its principle maritime trade routes. 
Yet, in spite of negative official statements, many countries believe that Japan has the capacity to develop nuclear weapons quickly due to 
its nuclear industry (Nagao 2018)
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that Japan will adopt a nuclear option. Yet, “it may have weakened the taboo in Japan to discuss 
publicly the nuclear weapons option” (Mochizuki 2007, 322) and reinforced the Japanese perception 
that “nuclear weapons are, after all, the ultimate trump card: if you can convince your enemy 
that you have a way to play the card and are actually prepared to go through with it, nothing is 
more powerful” (Colby 2018, 29).
In the technological field, Japan has gone through all of the important stages in order to 
obtain nuclear military capacity, with only a nuclear test not yet having been conducted. Yet, this 
does not represent any turnaround, but merely a precautionary principle. As it possesses launchers 
which permit it to send satellites in orbit, it is thus also clear that Japan retains the means for 
launching a nuclear device (Paris 2016, 5).
Underlining how only few have noticed that Japan also has become a space power, Grunden 
(2012, 949) pinpoints that it possesses the technical capacity and furthermore has positioned 
its national security as a fundamental element in the country’s strategy for spatial development, 
“The dual-use nature of some space technologies - such as launch vehicles and satellites - allowed 
Japan to make the rapid adaptation from commercial to military applications.”
With the creation of the National Space Development Agency in 1969, Japan launched its 
first satellite in 1970, and in the beginning of 1990, it already possessed nuclear technology with 
potential military uses. “Some analysts think that Japan can be considered as a proto-nuclear 
power, technologically ready to become a nuclear power if necessary” (Coulmy 1991, 225 apud 
Shimizu-Niquet 1994, 167-168).
With point of departure in the knowledge that North Korea can hit American territory, 
Kausikan (2018, 34) questions whether the U.S. would sacrifice San Francisco in order to save 
Tokyo. In the author’s view, Japan has the capacity to quickly develop an independent nuclear 
dissuasion, preparing itself for this eventuality for a long period of time, “with American 
acquiescence and perhaps assistance - for decades.” Yet, Yoshihari & Holmes (2009, 75), in spite 
of recognizing Japan’s strong potential to become nuclear, consider it to be highly unlikely 
that Tokyo would seek to maintain an independent nuclear arsenal in the near future. Not 
least considering the absence of intentions, at least in the short term, to break the Japan-U.S. 
Alliance, as well as the negative reactions in North East Asia. Even if this might be an unlikely 
situation, and even with the expansion of the North Korean nuclear threat, Japan appears 
to be conscious that an autonomous nuclear option could exacerbate the North Korean and 
Chinese security dilemmas, as well as the dilemma related to the U.S. abandonment, which 
would weaken its security guarantee as a consequence of the destabilizing effects on regional 
security (Hughes 2007b, 90). 
In an innovative approach, it becomes evident that Japan, in spite of the Fukushima disaster, 
will maintain its nuclear development in accordance with the techno-nationalist ideology which 
is profoundly rooted in Japanese society. From the Meiji Revolution, its principle of “rich nation, 
strong army,” the radical and militarist nationalism, and towards the defeat by a technically more 
advanced enemy, for Japan the development of nuclear energy has been “a prime example of the 
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high-technology, high-value-added export-oriented industry so important to the continued success 
of a mature economy such as Japan’s” (Kelly 2015, 48).
Conclusion
The Japanese security architecture is nurtured by a tripe composed by the Japan-U.S. Alliance, 
the role of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces (JSDF), and by the nuclear protection from its cover 
by the U.S. nuclear umbrella and its commitment to extended deterrence. On the one hand, the 
role of the JSDF is at present much more compatible with armed forces than with a self-defense 
mechanism. With advanced military capacities, it participates in collective self-defense actions, 
- with or without the U.S. presence, - as a way to contribute to the maintenance of regional 
and international security (Smith 2016; Paris 2016; Oros 2017; Samuels and Wallace 2018). 
Confronted with the insecurities related to the Japanese militarization, the maintenance of the 
Constitution’s Article 9 tends to be viewed as a demonstration of Japan’s pacifist character, which 
is reinforced by the continuity of the Japan-U.S. alliance. It should be noted that the Japan-U.S. 
Security Treaty gradually has been transformed into an alliance that is characterized by a variety 
of lines of security cooperation directives between these two actors, with relatively symmetrical 
roles, with the nuclear capacity as the main asymmetry. 
As it is strongly dependent upon the U.S. nuclear umbrella and extended deterrence, 
Japan has become confronted with a dilemma of whether or not to believe in a U.S. response 
to a real threat. Faced with such doubts, the pragmatic response from the Japanese leadership 
has been to seek to acquire nuclear technology as well as the plutonium resources that would 
allow it to develop its own deterrence capacity. Yet, Japan still makes it clear that its position 
is to reinforce the Japan-U.S. Alliance, and to stay below the U.S. nuclear protection. In this 
regard, the nuclear option aimed at the acquisition of such weapons will only be chosen if 
the Alliance and/or the nuclear protection would be discontinued. On the other hand, the 
U.S. distrust in relation to the Japanese nuclear potential, or the consolidation of a military 
partnership, has been relatively minimized, with the U.S. assuming a more tolerant - if not 
outright encouraging - posture.
For Japan there is still a significant issue, which often is not directly addressed, but which in 
practice relates to a belief that the mastering of nuclear knowledge and the consequent possession 
of nuclear weaponry confers a differentiated status to a state, thus permitting it to obtain a 
special locus amongst international powers. In a normal situation, Japan would be conscious of 
the importance which its cooperation with the U.S. holds in relation to the American interests 
within the region. In other terms, Japan needs the U.S., in much the same way that the U.S. 
needs Japan in order to continue its international policy with focus on East Asia. To this can be 
added the considerations related to the potential financial, economic, political, and diplomatic 
costs which Japan would have to assume in order to contain reactions, especially from China, 
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The Korean Peninsula, South East Asia, and even Russia. Even so, with a possible rupture, the 
response from the Japanese leadership might well be immediate, as the population, - in spite of 
its pacifism and systematic nuclear opposition, - seems to be conscious of the vulnerabilities and 
total insecurity in a regional context marked by threat and insecurity. 
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